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A Vicious Tenacity: The Efficiency
Strategy Confronted With the
Rebound Effect
Osman Arrobbio* and Dario Padovan
Department Culture, Politics and Society, Università degli Studi di Torino, Turin, Italy
Studies of the phenomena known as the “rebound effect,” “backfire,” and the “Jevons
Paradox” have cast doubt on the effectiveness, in terms of reduction of energy use,
of measures based on efficiency gains. Some of them have shown that efficiency
improvements are less effective than expected, others have lent strength to the
hypothesis that efficiency improvements are counterproductive in the long run. The
difference between the two groups is thus all but negligible. Moreover, it is of considerable
pragmatic significance as it may undermine the foundations of solid expectations that
had led to ongoing systems and repertoires of action. In this paper we provide a model
about the hypothesis that the expectations related to the effects that efficiency gains have
on energy and resource consumption may exacerbate the rebound effect and that they
prevent alternative strategies, that may turn out to be more effective in reducing energy
and resource use, to be enacted. In the concluding paragraph, we propose possibilities
for further hypothesis and empirical research that could lead to the refinement of the
model.
Keywords: rebound effect, energy efficiency, efficiency strategy, sufficiency, backfire, jevons paradox,
consumption caps
DEPICTING THE EFFECTS THAT EFFICIENCY GAINS HAVE ON
ENERGY AND RESOURCE CONSUMPTION
Following centuries-long changes to the idea of efficiency (Alexander, 2008), activities took shape
in the 1970s that—as suggested by ecological modernization theories—can be considered as stages
in a more general process aimed at enabling industrial societies to cope with the problems—which
had recently come to the fore—associated with a shortage of resources.
Wemay refer to these activities as “efficiency strategy” (Alcott, 2010). The efficiency strategy can
be seen as being based on a problematization1 having the followingmain characteristics: production
systems should be oriented toward finding increasingly efficient goods and processes, i.e., which
1The vocabulary we use here is in part drawn from Actor-Network Theory, and specifically the terminology describing the
stages of: (i) problematization, in which a focal actor defines a problem and its solution, frames a story, and identifies alliances
between actants as well as the roles they must follow; (ii) enrolment, which takes place when the identified actants accept the
roles assigned to them during problematization; (iii) mobilization of allies, which is when the network is capable of acting and
pursuing the program of action defined at the outset; (iv) betrayal, when the actants leave the coalition, and the program of
action is remodeled as a result (Callon, 1986).
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FIGURE 1 | Expected effect of efficiency gains on energy use (version 1).
require fewer and fewer resources for their production, and,
subsequently, for their use; these goods and processes would then
have emerged from the laboratories (public or private) and spread
through the broader economic systems; it was thus necessary
that research be redirected; that consumers ask for, and buy,
more efficient products as they became available; and that the
regulatory actors (national governments, for example) proceed
as quickly and efficiently as possible to remove the barriers that
could have impeded the creation and expansion of a market of
this kind. Given these conditions, the consumption of resources
would drop (Daly, 1973; Lovins, 1976, 1977; Von Weiszacker
et al., 1997). Such a problematization offered a solution, and,
what is more, a positive-sum solution, to industrial societies’
presumed inability to continue along their development path and
provided new life to a guiding concept—efficiency—for political
and economic actors (Guice, 1999; Borup et al., 2006; Rosa and
Scheuerman, 2009; Pollock and Williams, 2010).
Efficiency gains, though by no means the only solution
at hand, are nevertheless described as being in themselves
sufficient—or, better, capable of becoming sufficient, as
everything could become more efficient than it actually is
(Reijnders, 1998)—to solve the weighty problem of resource
scarcity.
Was that something substantially different from what had
previously been the development of industrialized societies?
In other words, were not efficiency gains already one of
the distinctive features—as motors of competitivity—of
industrialized societies? Not completely. On one side, innovation
was (and still is) also related to finding new ways to use (more)
resources. On the other side, it was only since that moment that
efficiency was considered as an object of dedicated measures and
policies. Moreover, despite all the most important categories
of actors were given a role in this problematization, some
others were not part of it: people, groups and scholars who
thought that efficiency—via technicization—dehumanize man
and deprive him of freedom; and—as what may be seen as a
practical translation of this first aspect—those who advocated
and/or concretely pursued a simpler life and simpler technical
systems (Schumacher, 1973; Alexander and McLeod, 2014).
In its simplicity, the expected effect of efficiency gains on
energy (and—more broadly—resource) use, can be represented
by the scheme at Figure 1.
In the early 1980’s, in the field of energy economics, it
was argued that the foundations laid at the problematization
stage were undermined by an error that could have prevented
the expected enrolment of energy and resources (that is, not
becoming scarcer) in the coalition of actors which was so
enthusiastically—or confidently—being amassed. The critique
FIGURE 2 | Expected effect of efficiency gains on energy use (version 2).
was based on a phenomenon known as the Jevons Paradox, first
formulated more than a century before by the economist (Jevons
1865). His intuition was later fleshed out in the “Khazzoom-
Brookes Postulate” (Khazzoom, 1980, 1989; Brookes, 1990). As
originally set out—with reference to energy efficiency, but it may
also apply to other resources—the postulate stated that “with
fixed real energy prices, energy efficiency gains will increase
energy consumption above what it would be without those gains”
(Saunders, 1992, p. 131)2. Given certain conditions, the effects of
efficiency gains would be as those represented in Figure 2, which
differs from Figure 1 on a single, though very important, aspect.
It is possible to identify two main categories of meanings
given to the rebound effect. On one side, it is used to refer to
the extent to which the actual outcome of measures based on
increasing efficiency falls short of the expected results. Thus, it
could be measured, and it is possible to say that there has been
a rebound effect of x% or y%. On the other side, rebound effect
is also used to describe the causes, responses, and mechanisms
leading to gaps between expected and actual results. Thus, it may
happen to be read or heard (Arrobbio, 2014a) that the rebound
effect (as measured difference) is due to the rebound effect (as
array of mechanisms) or that there has been a rebound effect
(one or more mechanisms have been activated) without rebound
effect (with no difference between expected and actual results)3.
An additional confusion may derive from the fact that rebound
effect is also found to be used as a sort of synonym of negative
side effect. In this case, confusion is not meant to derive from
the fact that actual results may be better than the expected ones
(the so-called positive rebound), but rather to the fact that a
rebound effect lower than 100% (thus not a “backfire”) means
that improvements of some width with respect to the starting
conditions have occurred.
Energy economists set out to scrutinize the Khazzoom-
Brookes postulate from the theoretical standpoint and verify it
empirically. Over the subsequent decades, ever more complex
tools for measuring the rebound effect were developed, together
with categorisations and definitions for investigating it (Turner,
2013). Though this process cannot be said to be over, it would
appear to have arrived at a dead end, or in other words a deep rift
has opened between scholars in the field. According to Herring
and Roy (2007), there are two contrasting opinions among
2This is a situation in which the rebound effect exceeds 100%. The formula used to
calculate the rebound effect is: (Expected reduction – Actual reduction)/Expected
reduction. A rebound effect in excess of 100% is called a “backfire,” meaning that
the Jevons Paradox has manifested.
3Though not central in our argumentation, we should recall that the latter is a
theoretically remote possibility, in the sense that whenever a result is expected, it is
likely actual result to be different from it, at least slightly.
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FIGURE 3 | Rebound effect (R.E.) as external to, and independent from,
efficiency gains.
scholars about the rebound effect: there are those who maintain
that the rebound effect is of slight to moderate magnitude
and, more importantly, that without efficiency improvements
resource consumption would have been higher than today’s; and
those who argue that efficiency gains can plausibly be seen as an
important factor in explaining the growth of economic systems
and their concurrent demand for resources. Unfortunately,
none of this hypothesis can be verified (or falsified). The
first one, because it is built on a counterfactual scenario; the
second one, because measurements are less and less reliable,
the more the boundaries of the system taken into consideration
are wider. So, the following questions are still left unsolved:
are increases in efficiency responsible (wholly or in part) for
increased consumption? Is striving for efficiency enough? There
are two possible ways to answer these questions. On one side
it is possible to say that yes, efficiency gains are effective in
reducing consumption, but there are external forces pushing
in the opposite direction [European Commission (EC), 2017]
(Figure 3).
Thus, an explanation for the worldwide increase in the
consumption of material and energy resources can be sought by
assigning responsibility and blame to an array of mechanisms
and subjects: the growth of emerging economies, the spread
of the Western lifestyle, the population increase, the obsession
with GDP, the emergence of new consumers and insatiability of
the old ones, planned obsolescence and the constant barrage of
publicity, to mention but a few. On the other side, it is possible
to say that efficiency gains are responsible for (at least part of)
the pushing toward increasing consumption. In this case, those
forces are considered as not completely external to/independent
from efficiency increases.
Before going on we should focus our attention on the
“enrolment” and “mobilization” phases. If results (i.e., decrease
of energy consumption) are not as expected, this could depend
on an as-yet incomplete, or less than optimal, mobilization
of actors. It can thus be argued that bureaucratic barriers
to obtaining incentives, economic difficulties, or problems in
accessing credit slow down the implementation of the efficiency
strategy. Of course, the level of mobilization could be higher than
it currently is: governments measures could be more incisive
and supportive; enterprises could give more funds to research
activities; consumers could pay more attention to the mid-
long term monetary and environmental savings. However, we
can recognize the forms by which the enrolment—if not also
the mobilization—actually manifests. The “efficiency strategy” is
object of non-partisan support (Rudin, 2000) via the programs
espoused by political parties and movements and even where
support is not particularly conspicuous, this does not indicate
FIGURE 4 | Efficiency gains create room for more consumption.
open or significant dissent. It can be seen from the energy labeling
system implemented across the European Union or elsewhere.
Additionally, it can be seen from the fact that in many countries,
expenditures for the purchase of high energy-efficiency domestic
appliances and for energy upgrades on existing buildings are
included in the exclusive list of tax-deductible expenses (which
in some cases may also include outlays for health and education,
and donations to charitable organizations). It can be derived
from the EU funds allocated to research programmes related to
energy-efficiency (e.g., 29.1 billion e for “Low-carbon energy”
and 39.7 billion e for “Transport” through the EU Cohesion
Fund for 2014–2020; 5.9 billion e for “Secure, clean and efficient
energy” in the EU Horizon 2020 research funding programme).
Lastly, it is evident from the efficiency gains registered in the EU
in all sectors since 2000 (18.6% overall; 20.5% industry; 13.7%
transport; 27.8% households)4.
Let us now take advantage of the following Sanne’s definition
to explain (Figure 4).
“...rebound effect is taken to mean the overall effects of technical,
organizational, and social progress, which increase the efficiency of
the economy and give room for more consumption” (Sanne, 2000,
p. 494).
Speaking of “giving room” has the advantage of making it
unnecessary to indicate the places, the practices and the subjects
that will fill this room. In addition, this definition draws
attention to another aspect of primary importance that clarifies
the relationship of cause and effect between efficiency and
increased consumption, viz., that increased efficiency does not
lead inevitably and/or immediately to increased consumption,
but it does inevitably make it more likely for consumption to
rise. The room for consumption that is thus created will then (or
can then) be filled as rapidly as the various mechanisms of the
rebound effect (here intended as dependent from the efficiency
increases) come into play, mechanisms that, simplifying the
literature5, we can classify as: (i) economic: greater efficiency
brings down the cost, and this encourages demand (at the micro
4Data retrieved from http://www.odyssee-mure.eu/ (Accessed September 14,
2018).
5There is an extensive literature on the rebound effect. The summary we propose
here is based chiefly on the following articles and reports: Berkhout et al. (2000);
Greening et al. (2000); Hertwick (2005); Sorrell (2007, 2009); Polimeni et al. (2009);
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as well as the macro level); (ii) psychological: where, for example,
owning high-efficiency goods satisfies the ecological motivation
for action, and this leads to a more “relaxed” attitude toward
using and consuming these or other goods; (iii) technological:
where efficiency gains for a good lead to the situation in which
this good fulfills new and additional functions. In turn, the
room that is created can be larger when certain not-infrequent
conditions obtain: synergistic effects between production factors,
“transformational” effects (creation of whole new economic
sectors) and situations where the efficiency gain affects so-called
pervasive resources, goods and technologies.
DIFFICULTIES IN ACTIVATING
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES FOR THE
REDUCTION OF ENERGY AND RESOURCE
USE
What are the factors that, aside from the periods in which
economic systems enter a crisis, could slow or prevent the
rebound effect? Though no sharp dividing line can readily be
drawn, we can distinguish between the factors that operate
“downstream,” when the room is filling up less quickly, and
those operating “upstream,” when the creation of more room
for consumption is “artificially” limited or blocked. Such an
outcome could be achieved by implementing systems based on
quotas, such as consumption caps, cap-and-trade schemes, or on
rationing the use of resources (Figure 5). These have been defined
as “left-side” measures, from the left side of the I = f (P, A, T)
formula (Alcott, 2010).
This, then, could be a stepping-stone toward counter-
problematization: what would be necessary is the international
(worldwide) introduction of consumption caps. Other solutions
could in fact slow, or perhaps even accelerate, the mechanisms of
the rebound effect, but they could not in any case prevent them
from occurring.
Although the counter-problematization can be expressed in
a few words, enrolling the actors who accept it would entail
difficulties that must not be underestimated, as it calls for
a radical overhaul of entrenched beliefs and repertoires of
action. The notion of repertoire of ecological action derives
from that of the repertoire of collective action (Tilly, 1976)
propounded by the sociology of social movements. Echoing
Neveu (1996), we can say that the ecologically oriented actors
(social movements being one of them) are faced with a pre-
existing sample of actions that are coded and accessible to
varying extents. Actions based on efficiency are only a portion
of a larger repertoire of possible ecologically-oriented actions
and measures. These can be taken in many forms, individual
or collective, direct or indirect, they can rely on sanctions or
incentives, information or coercion, persuasion, or intimidation,
etc. What we want to point out here is that these actions and
the modes they employ may be in competition with each other
(Buenstorf and Cordes, 2008; Bartiaux and Reátegui Salmón,
Jenkins et al. (2011); Maxwell et al. (2011); European Environment Agency (EEA)
(2013); Santarius and Soland (2018).
2012; Ozaki and Shaw, 2014). Actions based on efficiency are
credited with an almost unparalleled effectiveness due not only
to the alleged advantages in environmental terms, but also to a
whole series of economic advantages (individual and collective)
and strategic benefits [International Energy Agency (IEA), 2014].
Besides demonstrating one of the ways the efficiency strategy
manifests, the already mentioned fact that in many countries,
expenditures for the purchase of more efficient goods (equipment
or installations) have been added to the very short list of tax-
deductible expenses is in our opinion equivalent to a government
subsidy for technological and individual solutions and may in
practice make other solutions less viable.
Figure 6 integrates a plurality of new aspects with respect
to the previous figure, so let us explain them in detail. The
higher the energy use, the higher the need to adopt measures to
reduce it6. These can be “left-” or “right-side” measures (which
besides the efficiency-based ones, also include sufficiency-based
measures and actions, eco-taxes and bonus-malus schemes). The
competition amongmeasures we referred to above, is represented
by the only one double-sided arrow, which is meant to mean that
themore we follow one strategy, the less we follow the other (only
one of them can be considered hierarchically—thus practically—
superior at a given time). If efficiency gains increase together with
energy (and resource) consumption, maymeans that the strength
of “efficiency-as-solution” (by “efficiency strategy” we mean here
its strength, attractiveness and rhetorical apparatus) may be
immune, and—at least so far—positively correlated to its failures,
thus representing a reinforcing loop. This may partially be seen as
a consequence of concealing/emphasizing flows, which consists
of cherry-picking indicators and data: about the use of specific
resources; the emissions of a few specific substances; a single
stage in the life cycle of goods; a given limited geographical area.
It thus entails selecting a few aspects out of the overall picture,
and ignoring the possible interrelations between phenomena: the
reduction of emissions in areas undergoing deindustrialisation,
as opposed to the increase in pollution in recently industrialized
cities (Rice, 2009; Peng et al., 2016); the reduction in paper-
based documents, as opposed to the increase in electronic waste,
etc. (Berkhout and Hertin, 2004; Hilty, 2008; Røpke et al.,
2010; Williams, 2011). Another relationship added in Figure 6
is that the higher the expectations about the beneficial effects
of efficiency increase, the higher the possibility for some of the
rebound effect mechanisms (namely, the “psychological” ones)
to enter in action.
On the consumption side, efficiency gains increase the
possibility for consumers to enter in contact with ever more
objects and to be engaged in ever more practices (Heikkurinen,
2016). The higher the number of objects consumers enter
(directly or indirectly) in contact with, in a higher number of
practices they are practitioners of, the less likely they will be prone
to ask or accept to live without them. The presumed efficacy
of efficiency gains thus allows consumers not to have to quit
their careers as efficiency consumers, which may contribute to
explain why the need formeasures to reduce energy consumption
6It may not have a universal validity, being a deliberate self-destruction
accelerating process another possible outcome.
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FIGURE 5 | The role of ‘left-side’ measures in preventing consumption increase.
FIGURE 6 | Comprehensive view of the model: interrelations of beneficial and adverse effects of different strategies to reduce energy consumption.
is required to be satisfied by “right-side” measures. Moreover,
being more and more practices carried out more efficiently,
higher output levels are delivered by them. These higher output
levels push normality upward (Shove, 2017) and are thus
required even when the most efficient processes are not available.
This last aspect may completely counterbalance the effects on
demand that can be expected from its saturation, represented
in Figure 6 by the only one bifurcating arrow (bottom right
side).
It already happened the benefits to be gained from efficiency
increases to be doomed as optimistic, when not unfounded. The
first wave of criticism with respect to the supposed beneficial
effects of efficiency gains took place in the nineteenth century,
launched by Jevons and other scholars (Polimeni et al., 2009),
but it was neutralized by the subsequent increased ability
to find and exploit the world natural resources. The second
one was a reaction to the discourses on the dematerialisation
of the economy that originated in the 1970s, but it got
stuck by the controversies among scholars we mentioned
above.
Although the debate has remained substantially confined
within the bounds of expert spheres, something occasionally
managed to penetrate the frontiers. Between late 2010 and
early 2011, several non-specialist magazines and newspapers
presented the “rebound effect” to a broader public. Noteworthy
articles appeared in “Le Monde Diplomatique” during July
2010 (Gossart, 2010) and the “The New Yorker” in December
2010 (Owen, 2010), followed by articles in “The New York
Times” (Tierney, 2011) and “The Guardian” (Rowley, 2011)
during the year that followed. Even if they failed to do full
justice to the theoretical debate, these articles helped expose a
broader public to doubts concerning the benefits of efficiency
gains. In the debates that followed and that took place in
technical reports, papers in prestigious reviews as well as
in the blogosphere, it happened the scientific inconsistency
of the “backfire theories” to be stated, and its adherents to
be discredited as—among other things—unshakable Luddites
(Ackerman and Stanton, 2011; Gillingham et al., 2013; Arrobbio,
2014a,b).
In the same period, in 2011, the EU funded a project entitled
“Addressing the rebound effect,” which involved exchange of
views between some 50 expert stakeholders. As what may
be considered—at least for chronological reasons—as one the
project’s first results, the rebound effect was cited in the
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European Commission’s Communication 571 on the same
year.
“However, it has been shown that in some cases, cost savings made
from improving the efficiency of a technology can actually induce
people to consume more. This phenomenon, known as a “rebound
effect” must be anticipated, and accounted for, in developing policy
and setting targets” [European Commission (EC), 2011].
Nonetheless, the rebound effect and Jevons Paradox are absent
from most energy and environmental policy guidelines and
technical reports (Font Vivanco et al., 2016). If they are
mentioned at all, it is often only as a timid call for caution in
boasting of the benefits to be had from increases in efficiency, or
to display that the existence of some “social factors” is recognized.
The EU has been temporizing with a compromise that retains
the current regime (i.e., the efficiency strategy) but at the same
time cannot be regarded as lasting, as it seems to be mainly listing
the rebound effect under the umbrella of accountancy issues,
where also lays the issue of the inaccuracy of expected savings:
rebound effect level may look higher than in reality because
engineering estimates of savings are inaccurate; estimated savings
may have been exaggerated purposely by producers, in a sort of
“Volkswagen-like” style applied to electric household appliances;
but inaccuracy may also be due to overestimation of the level
of consumption prior to the efficiency gains (e.g., Sunikka-Blank
and Galvin, 2012).
How could the flux of environmental measures be rerouted
from the “right-side” to the “left-side”? Let us extensively quote a
passage from Smil (2010):
“There has been a widespread agreement that the new transition
must be accompanied [. . . ] by higher efficiency of energy use.
[. . . ] Fortunately, possibilities of such gains remain no less
promising today than they appeared two generations ago: this
energy transition toward more rational energy use can continue for
decades to come. But better conversion efficiencies alone are not
enough, they will just keep confirming a lasting truth of Jevons’s
venerable paradox that ≪it is wholly a confusion of ideas to
suppose that the economical use of fuel is equivalent to a diminished
consumption. The very contrary is the truth≫ (Jevons, 1865, p.
140). The second precondition of a successful new transition in all
affluent nations must be to avoid consuming more energy more
efficiently, and this means that by far the most important step
that those countries should take are gradual but significant overall
reductions of energy use.” (Smil, 2010, p. 150).
In an incredibly diplomatic way, Smil suggests a complete
reversal of the efficiency strategy. Of course, not in the sense
that we should aim at increasing inefficiency (whatever it might
mean). Rather in the sense that given that, at their best, efficiency
gains have minor effects, they should be given a secondary
and ancillary role. Why was such a resort to tact necessary?
How could the actors of the efficiency strategy’s coalition accept
such a disruptive translation of their visions? The sectors of
production and technological research would no longer be able
to seek justification, or reward, from operating “ecologically,”
at least until such time as the counter-program has been
fulfilled. Similarly, the public, who is with difficulty beginning
to obtain gratification and rewards from its efforts at ecological
consumerism and a few ecological micro-practices, should once
again, or chiefly, turn toward the political sphere, toward broader
geographical and decision-making levels, toward predominately
collective action (Dalton, 1996; Norris, 1999; Micheletti, 2003;
Blühdorn, 2017; Theocharis and VanDeth, 2018). For its part, the
environmental movement may believe that with the strategy (or
the ideal) of sufficiency and by helping to identify inefficiency,
waste and the responsibilities for them, it has already made a
vital contribution (and, above all, a contribution which is believed
to be alternative—or at least complementary—to the efficiency
strategy) to achieving sustainability (Princen, 2005; McDonald
et al., 2006; Alcott, 2008).
CONCLUSION
In this paper we aimed at delivering a model about the fact
that the efficiency strategy, which consists of both an array of
concrete actions and measures, and the rationale attributed to
it, exacerbates the rebound effect. More importantly, we suggest
that the efficiency strategy prevents alternative strategies, that
may turn out to be more effective in reducing energy and
resource use, to be (more decisively) enacted. We claim that
the higher the expectations on energy efficiency, the lower the
results, not in terms of efficiency gains, but rather in terms of
reduction of energy and resource use. We hypothesize that we
are dealing with a reinforcing loop on which the higher the
severity of environmental problems and resource and energy
scarcity, the more the efficiency strategy is given strength. Such
a reinforcing loop emerges because of the need of the coalition
of actors (supposedly) playing the efficiency strategy to preserve
its integrity. At the same time, it comes from the difficulties—
which on their turn are due to the strength of the rhetorical
apparatus sustaining the efficiency strategy—to create and enact
a counter-programme of action.
It is out of our possibilities to say whether the reinforcing
loop will go on indefinitely or not. However, it is possible to
see the reactions that the efficiency strategy’s proponents have
been putting in place. The first one consists in considering the
causes of the rebound effect and the backfire as external to, and
independent from, the efficiency increases. The second one may
consist in rearrangements to the narratives, to the rhetorical
apparatus of the efficiency strategy, which has recently been
reinforced by concepts such as circular economy and energy
transition to renewables (which is not yet clear whether they
represent any substantial change or not), and by the “energy
efficiency first” principle (which we doubt is something new).
Moreover, we suggest that the efficiency strategy—together
with the definition of the functioning of the rebound effect
which is linked to it—currently represents the only acceptable
or viable programme of action for the current coalition (as it
is the most acceptable and viable for the actors mobilized in
it) regardless of whether it is (really) effective or not. Contrary
to what would happen in case of practical acceptance of the
“left-side” arguments, the efficiency strategy allows its members
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to play. It should be difficult to act ecologically in a system
which is inherently taking into account of planet’s and ecological
boundaries. In a system where this does not happen, playing
ecologically, or playing at being less ecologically-harmfully, is
possible. Could not—as we suggested—the “left-side” and “right-
side” measures coexist at the same hierarchical level, this would
bring the need to dismantle the efficiency strategy, or at least
the discourses about its beneficial effect, until the effectiveness of
efficiency gains in reducing consumption is proven.
Finally, the model we delivered is built on arguments and
hypothesis that we tried to make evident, hoping that in this
way they can be subject to further debate and refinement and
may offer suggestions for further research. Our argumentations
may mainly derive from having concentrated our efforts on the
EU context and on having interpreted efficiency unspecifically.
Further lines of enquiry may thus relate to the validity of the
model in different economic, social and political contexts and in
specific applications of efficiency improvements.
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